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Appeal would seem to be equally so under the New Brunswick 
Marriage Act, with the result that only marriages performed in 
accordance with, or subsequently validated by the terms of the 
Act, are valid in New Brunswick.
Roderick M. Bryden*
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Today we ordinarily hear of only two types of concurrent 
ownership in land: tenancy in common and joint tenancy. How­
ever, the common law knew two other types of concurrent owner­
ship: tenancy by entireties and coparcenary. Coparcenary was 
the descent of land on intestacy in the absence of a male heir 
to several daughters as co-heirs. This form of tenure has now 
vanished because of its inconsistency with the provisions of the 
Devolution of Estates Act.1 But tenancy by entireties raises more 
difficult problems, and the purpose of this note is to consider 
whether or not this old form of common law tenancy has also, 
in effect, been abolished by provincial legislation.
Tenancy by entireties was peculiar to the marital status. If a 
husband and wife took land in such a way as would make them 
joint tenants but for the fact that they were married, they were 
deemed to have taken as tenants by entireties,2 and this was so 
even if the land were expressly conveyed to them as joint tenants.* 
The interests of the spouses were joint and unseverable; neither 
spouse could alienate any part of the estate without obtaining 
permission to do so from the other. Upon the death of one 
spouse, the other became seised of the whole estate, but during 
their joint lives, there were, as between husband and wife, no 
moieties.4 A tenancy by entireties could exist in any estate, 
whether in fee, for life, for years, or otherwise.5
* Roderick M. Bryden, II Law, U.N.B. Mr. Bryden is a Sir James Dunn
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1 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 62.
2 Green d. Crew  v. King (1778), 2 Wm. Bl. 1212, at p. 1212; 96 E.R. 
713, at p. 714.
3 Pollok v. Kelly (1856), 6 I.C.L.R. 367.
4 Marquis of Winchester’s Case (1583), 3 Co. Rep. la, at p. 52; 76 E.R. 
621, at p. 631.
5 Megarry, A Manual of the Law of Real Property, 2nd ed., at p. 261.
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We must now examine a number of New Brunswick statutory 
provisions that may affect tenancy by entireties. The first is 
section 19 of the Property Act.6 It states :
19. An estate hereafter created, granted or devised to two or
more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in common, 
unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy; but every estate 
vested in trustees or executors as such shall be held by them in 
joint tenancy.
The effect of a similar provision, section 10 of chapter 82 of the 
Consolidated Statutes of Upper Canada, was discussed in Shaver v. 
Hart? Section 10 enacted that whenever by any assurance 
executed after July 1, 1834, land shall be granted to two or more 
persons, it shall be considered that such persons took as tenants 
in common, and not as joint tenants, unless an intention sufficiently 
appeared on the face of the assurance that they were to take as 
joint tenants. In Shaver v. Hart, property was conveyed to a 
married couple in 1836, and the court had to decide if they held 
as joint tenants or as tenants by entireties. The court found that 
the couple held as tenants by entireties, and that section 10 did not 
affect a conveyance of property to husband and wife. Morrison, J., 
stated at page 607 :
. . .  the only conveyances in the mind of the Legislature were 
those which without the Act would have passed the lands in joint 
tenancy, and, . . .  a conveyance to husband and wife would not 
do so.8
When Shaver v. Hart was decided there was in existence a 
statute9 which gave married women the right to hold real estate 
separately, but this Act was not in force when the conveyance 
was made in 1836 and the court did not make reference to this 
provision in reaching its decision. This provision is now contained 
in clause (c) of section 2 of the New Brunswick Married Woman’s 
Property Act, which reads:
2. Subject to the provisions of this Act, a married woman shall
(c ) be capable of acquiring, holding and disposing o f any 
property.10
This section is intended only to enable a married woman to deal 
with land as a feme sole. The words “shall be capable” are 
permissive, and not mandatory.
6 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 177.
7 (1872), 31 U.C.Q.B. 603.
8 Ibid., at p. 607, per Morrison, J.
9 C.S.U.C., 1856, c. 73.
10 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 140.
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The combined effect of this provision and the provision pro­
viding that a grant to two or more persons prima facie creates a 
tenancy in common was discussed in Re Wilson and Toronto 
Incandescent Light Company,11 where H and W were married in 
1864 and in 1874 property was conveyed to them as husband and 
wife. The wife died in 1887. The Married Woman’s Property 
Act was passed in Ontario in 1872 and this raised the following 
question: is the husband the sole owner of the estate as he would 
be if H and W held by the entireties or does he inherit only half 
the estate which would be the case if H and W held as tenants in 
common? In arriving at his decision, Falconbridge, J., examined 
Shaver v. Hart, and a number of English decisions, including 
Re Jupp12 and Re March.13 He found that Shaver v. Hart was not 
in point because the conveyance in that case had been made before 
the Married Woman’s Property Act was passed. He then decided, 
relying on the English decisions, that under the conveyance made 
in 1874 H and W took as strangers, and so were tenants in com­
mon by virtue of the Ontario provision similar to section 19 of 
the New Brunswick Property Act.
Spring v. Kinee,1* a 1928 Ontario Court of Appeal decision, 
followed Re Wilson and Toronto Incandescent Light Company. 
The facts in the two cases were essentially the same, and 
Middleton, J.A., giving the judgment of the court, said:
. . .  the effect of the Married Woman’s Property Act is to enable 
the wife to take as though she were a feme sole, and so the 
effect of the marital relationship is ended so far as real property 
is concerned.15
It would appear, then, from Spring v. Kinee that the M arried 
Woman’s Property Act enables the wife to take real property as 
though she were a feme sole, and as such, she and her husband 
come under section 12 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property 
Act and take as tenants in common rather than as joint tenants.
The finding of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Spring v. 
Kinee rested undisturbed until 1958. In that year the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Campbell v. Sovereign Securities & Holding 
Company, Limited10 handed down a decision that placed a dif­
ferent interpretation on the Married Woman’s Property Act from 
that applied in Spring v. Kinee. In the Campbell case, the
11 (1891), 20 O.R. 397.
12 (1888), 39 Ch. D. 148.
13 (1883), 24 Ch. D. 222.
14 (1928), 62 O.L.R. 562.
15 Ibid., at p. 564.
16 [1958] O.R. 441.
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plaintiff and her husband entered into a contract to sell land to X, 
who later assigned the contract to the defendant. This was an 
action by the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract of 
sale and purchase of the land by the defendants. The plaintiff 
and her husband did not own the land at the time they agreed to 
sell to the defendant. However, they agreed to purchase this land 
from a vendor who had sold them land before. The previous land 
sold by the vendor to the husband and plaintiff had been con­
veyed to them as joint tenants. The husband died before a deed 
from the vendor could be delivered to him and his wife, the 
plaintiff. However, at trial the plaintiff testified that the intention 
was to have the land conveyed by terms that would have made 
her and her husband joint tenants in this new parcel of land, and 
not tenants in common. The trial judge believed the plaintiff’s 
testimony in this matter. In other words, at the date of the 
husband’s demise, a mere executory agreement for the sale and 
purchase of land existed between the vendor and the plaintiff. 
After her husband’s demise, the plaintiff proposed to obtain a deed 
from the original vendor to her and her husband as joint tenants, 
and then transfer a deed to the defendants from herself in her 
personal capacity as survivor. The defendants did not repudiate 
the contract of purchase, but they failed to discharge their obli­
gations under it, contending that a transfer of title in the way 
proposed by the plaintiff was not satisfactory to them. Stewart, J., 
in the High Court of Justice found for the plaintiff. He held that 
the executory contract between the plaintiff and the original vendor 
was not an “assurance” of land within section 12 of the Convey­
ancing and Law of Property Act of Ontario. The section reads as 
follows:
12. (1 ) Where by any letters patent, assurance or will, made
and executed after the 1st day of July, 1834, land has been or is 
granted, conveyed or devised to two or more persons other than 
executors or trustees in fee simple, or for any less estate, it shall 
be considered that such persons took or take as tenants in 
common, and not as joint tenants, unless an intention sufficiently 
appears on the face of such letters patent, assurance or will, that 
they are to take as joint tenants.
(2 ) This section shall apply notwithstanding that one of 
such persons is the wife of another of them.17
Stewart, J., further held that since the agreement for sale did not 
fall within section 12, then the husband and wife took as tenants 
by entireties and not as tenants in common. This decision, which 
was later confirmed on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal,18
17 R.S.O., 1950, c. 68.
18 [1958] O.R. 441.
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is contrary to Re Wilson and Spring v. Kinee in that it holds that 
the Married Woman’s Property Act did not abolish tenancy by 
entireties:
I do not think that the Married Woman’s Property Act ousts 
the doctrine of the unity of the husband and wife (and upon 
which the concept of tenancy by entirety is really based) . . .10
The Campbell case can be authority only for executory agreements 
for the sale of realty. The case does not decide that had the facts 
here been caught by section 12 of the Conveyancing and Law of 
Property Act, the tenancy would have been by entireties.
The question then, as far as New Brunswick is concerned, is: 
does section 19 of our Property Act differ sufficiently from 
section 12 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act of 
Ontario to include an executory agreement for the sale of realty 
such as existed in the Campbell case? The pertinent words used 
in section 19 are “an estate . . . created, granted, or devised”. 
In the Campbell case, there was no devise or grant. There may, 
however, have been a “creation” of an estate. Section 12 of the 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act does not use the word 
“create”, but rather the words “granted, conveyed or devised” . In 
an executory agreement for the sale of realty, the purchaser, before 
any deed is passed, has an equitable interest or right in the prop­
erty and may call for specific performance of the agreement should 
the vendor refuse to convey. Does this “equitable interest or right” 
arising out of the agreement of sale amount to an estate? Accord­
ing to the New Brunswick Interpretation Act, section 3 8 (1 3 ):
38. (13) “estate” or “property” means real and personal 
property; and “real estate”, “land” or “lands” includes lands, 
houses, tenements and hereditaments, all rights thereto and 
incident therein;20
It is submitted that an executory agreement for the sale of 
realty creates an estate in equity. If this is so, then section 19 of 
the Property Act would control such an agreement. Consequently 
an agreement of sale between H and W, purchasers, and X, vendor, 
could not amount to a tenancy by entireties on the authority of the 
Campbell case.
To summarize, in Ontario there is a division of judicial 
opinion concerning the interpretation of the Married Woman’s 
Property Act: Spring v. Kinee held that that Act ended the marital
19 Ibid., per Stewart, J., at p. 444; this view is criticized by Professor 
Laskin in a case comment in (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 370.
20 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 114. (italics mine)
UJV.B. LA W  JOURNAL 69
relationship so far as real property is concerned, and the Campbell 
case held the opposite. Both are court of appeal decisions. In 
New Brunswick, section 19 of the Property Act may be somewhat 
wider in its scope than section 12 of the Conveyancing and Law of 
Property Act of Ontario, and may control executory agreements 
for the sale of realty as well as actual conveyances. If so, tenancy 
by entireties would appear to be impossible in this province.
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